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On October 28, 2012, an earthquake occurred offshore Canada, with a magnitude
Mw of 7.8, triggering a tsunami that propagated through the Pacific Ocean. The
tsunami numerical model results show it would not be expected to generate
widespread inundation on Hawaii. Yet, two hours after the earthquake, the
Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) issued a tsunami warning to the state of
Hawaii. Since the state was hit by several tsunamis in the past, regular siren
exercises, tsunami hazard maps and other prevention measures are available for
public use, revealing that residents are well prepared regarding tsunami
evacuation procedures. Nevertheless, residents and tourists evacuated mostly by
car, and because of that, heavy traffic was reported, showing that it was a non-
viable option for evacuation. The tsunami caused minor damages on the
coastline, and several car accidents were reported, with one fatality. In recent
years, there has been a remarkable interest in tsunami impacts. However, if risk
planners seem to be very knowledgeable about how to avoid or mitigate their
potential harmful effects, they seem to disregard its integration with other sectors
of human activity and other social factors.
1. Introduction
On Sunday, October 28, 2012, at 3:04 (UTC) an earthquake occurred offshore Haida
Gwaii (former Queen Charlotte Islands), in the western British Columbia, Canada,
with a magnitude Mw 7.8 (USGS). This earthquake generated a tsunami that propa-
gated through the Pacific Ocean, being recorded, among other instruments, on the
tide gauge stations in real time (NOAA). About two hours after the earthquake the
Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) issued a tsunami warning to the state of
Hawaii. In the meantime, the tsunami continued to propagate through the Pacific
Ocean, reaching Hawaii about 5 hours and 30 minutes after the earthquake occurred,
with reduced inundation areas and less impacts than expected.
Since the nineteenth century Hawaii has been hit by at least 25 tsunamis that caused
damage and 8 of those tsunamis caused deaths: 1837, 1868, 1877, 1923, 1946, 1957,
1960 and 1975, either by local or trans-oceanic tsunamis (Lander & Lockridge 1989).
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The past events led to the creation of the warning system and more recent events indi-
cate the need to find tools for improving it. Spatial planning authorities and emergency
agents have been in urgent need of operational tools that would provide accurate tsu-
nami forecast as guidance for rapid, critical decisions in which lives and property are
at stake. In addition, significant efforts have been carried out in order to reduce tsu-
nami hazards along the US coastline (Titov et al. 2005). These efforts include the instal-
lation of a variety of real-time instruments (Bernard 2005; Gonzalez et al. 2005; Titov
et al. 2005). One of the main concerns was to quickly confirm potentially destructive
tsunamis and reduce false alarms (Bernard 2005), since false evacuations are costly
both in terms of monetary expenses and in terms of authority’s credibility.
The combination of the tsunami numerical model simulation with real-time tsu-
nami data is a useful tool for the tsunami warning system, especially for far-field
tsunamis (Titov et al. 2005). Still, redundant methods should be used for a safe and
organized evacuation. The PTWC, originally known as the Honolulu Magnetic
Observatory, was established in Hawaii in 1948 as a tsunami warning system for
the United States and later renamed to the PTWC in 1968 after its responsibility
was expanded to include the nations throughout the Pacific (Igarashi et al. 2011).
Since the creation of the warning system, the state of Hawaii has been improving
the tsunami preparedness by creating tsunami hazard maps for public use and
scheduling regular siren exercises, which also involves the participation of local
communities. Although there remains some uncertainty about the level of public
understanding of the sirens and their implications for behavioural response (Gregg
et al. 2007), Hawaiian residents are well prepared regarding the tsunami prepared-
ness. Furthermore, stakeholders have contingency plans in order to safely evacuate
the coastal populations. The plans involve, among other tools, vertical evacuation
signs (figure 1).
Knowledge about past events is relevant because previous involvement in hazard
incidents is important in the risk perception (Queiros et al. 2007; Momani & Salmi
2012). In fact, as mentioned by Tavares et al. (2010) risk perception levels depend
more on general knowledge and the ability to have access to sources of information.
For example, during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, residents in Simeulue Island,
Indonesia and the nomadic Moken in Myanmar and Thailand evacuated safely to
higher ground because they remembered past hazard incidents (Santos et al. 2007).
Although at that time the tsunami warning system was not implemented, these
accounts showed that knowledge about past events is indeed important for the risk
perception, even without any warning system. In addition, the analysis of the
survivors’ accounts of the 2011 Tohoku Tsunami (Santos & Queiros 2013) showed
that several people evacuated to higher ground because they remembered past tsu-
nami events, even without any further warning system information (Santos et al.
2011; Santos & Fonseca 2013).
Although several studies have been focusing on evacuation planning based on
simulation and models (Xudong et al. 2009), the only way to test such models is to
conduct drills and evacuation exercises (Kobes et al. 2010; Queiros & Santos 2013).
In addition, evacuation drills help to develop “muscle memory” (Dengler et al.
2011) to prepare and to respond appropriately to the natural warning signals of
local tsunamis. Moreover, the analysis of the survivors’ accounts of the 2011
Tohoku Tsunami (Santos & Queiros 2013) showed that knowledge about
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emergency plans, combined with regular drills and evacuation exercises, allowed
efficient tsunami preparedness. Nevertheless, for each disaster that occurs there are
important lessons, either by a large event (Santos et al. 2007) or a small disaster
(Voss & Wagner 2010).
Currently the PTWC has four types of messages: warning, advisory, watch and
information statement. The meaning of these messages is widely spread for public
use. The October 28, 2012, tsunami triggered a tsunami warning that was issued for
the state of Hawaii by the PTWC, meaning that it is necessary to evacuate low-lying
coastal areas.
Thus, the objectives of this study are to compile real-time tsunami data, calculate
the tsunami propagation, by carrying out the tsunami numerical model, and to ana-
lyze the evacuation process in Hawaii through the eyewitnesses’ accounts. The les-
sons from this event would be useful for improving the risk management and spatial
planning policies, as well as in the dissemination of strategic implementations that
include the combination of the tsunami numerical model simulation with real-time
tsunami data, and tsunami evacuation processes, because local communities should
know what to do in an emergency situation. These strategies would be important not
only to Hawaii, but also to other coastal regions that are vulnerable to tsunamis in
order to create tsunami-resilient communities.
Figure 1. Tsunami vertical sign that indicates entering a hazard zone. (Photo taken by the
third author at the California coast on 2013 May 13).
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2. Tide gauge data
The real-time tsunami data were compiled from messages that were received in real
time, by an email notification service provided by the PTWC. The stations are dis-
tributed along the coastlines of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii
and British Colombia, as presented on figure 2. Later, the PTWC and the National
Tsunami Warning Center have reviewed the tsunami arrival times on these stations.
Furthermore, seven DART stations, which are located on deep waters (approximate
water depths between 2800 m and 4480m), also recorded the tsunami. The data are
summarized in table 1, which includes the name and location of 36 stations, arrival
time (UTC), and arrival time of the maximum water level height and its value.
The tsunami reached DART 46419 (#34) and Winter harbour station (#8) in less
than one hour after the earthquake. In the meanwhile, the tsunami continued to prop-
agate and was recorded at the tide gauge stations of Port Alexander (#7), DART
46404 (#35), DART 46410 (#30), Sitka (#6), DART 46409 (#31), La Push (#11) and
Elfin Cove (#5). In less than four hours after the earthquake, the tsunami reached all
the coastlines of Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California. About 5 hours and 30
minutes after the earthquake, at 8:30 (UTC), or 10:30 (HST), the tsunami waves
started to arrive at Hawaii. The tsunami had small wave heights in all stations, but
there was a significant amplification in Hawaii, especially on Haleiwa (#23), Honolulu
(#25), Makapuu (#26), Kahului (#27), Kawaihae (#28) and Hilo (#29).
Figure 2. Location of the tide gauge stations, as presented in table 1, and the epicentre.
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3. Tsunami numerical model
3.1 The earthquake
The earthquake occurred on Sunday, October 28, 2012, at 3:04 (UTC), with its epi-
centre offshore Haida Gwaii (former Queen Charlotte Islands), in the western British
Columbia, Canada (figure 3). The local time in the state of Hawaii (HST) was
















1 Sand Point, AK 55.3 160.5 6:48 8:14 0.06
2 Kodiak Island, AK 57.7 152.5 6:01 6:01 0.14
3 Seward, AK 60.1 149.4 6:00 — 0.16
4 Yakutat, AK 59.5 139.7 5:22 11:35 0.15
5 Elfin Cove, AK 58.2 136.3 4:34 4:48 0.07
6 Sitka, AK 57.1 135.3 4:26 5:58 0.10
7 Port Alexander, AK 56.2N 134.6W 4:10 6:02 0.11
8 Winter harbour, BC 50.7N 128.3W 4:01 5:50 0.22
9 Neah bay, WA 48.4N 124.6W 5:03 6:38 0.11
10 Port Angeles, WA 48.1N 123.4W 5:50 6:40 0.12
11 La Push, WA 47.5N 124.4W 4:48 7:57 0.12
12 Westport, WA 46.9N 124.1W 5:13 5:21 0.08
13 Garibaldi, OR 45.6N 123.9W 5:12 5:19 0.05
14 South beach, OR 44.6N 124.0W 5:28 5:28 0.09
15 Charleston, OR 43.3 124.3 5:23 7:32 0.13
16 Port Orford, OR 42.7 124.5 5:21 8:41 0.23
17 Crescent city, CA 41.7 124.2 5:44 9:14 0.44
18 Arena Cove, CA 38.9 123.7 6:01 6:37 0.35
19 San Francisco, CA 37.8 122.5 6:52 8:02 0.14
20 Port San Luis, CA 35.2 120.8 6:36 8:10 0.27
21 Hanalei, HI 22.2N 159.5W 8:29 8:54 0.19
22 Nawiliwili, HI 22 159.4 8:51 — 0.03
23 Haleiwa, HI 21.6N 158.1W 8:30 8:57 0.43
24 Mokuloe, HI 21.4N 157.8W 8:34 8:57 0.09
25 Honolulu, HI 21.3 157.9 8:44 9:09 0.20
26 Makapuu, HI 21.3N 157.7W 9:34 9:35 0.27
27 Kahului, HI 20.9 156.5 8:37 9:07 0.79
28 Kawaihae, HI 20 155.8 8:42 9:34 0.56
29 Hilo, HI 19.7 155.1 8:37 10:11 0.29
30 DART 46410 57.6N 143.8W 4:28 — 0.03
31 DART 46409 55.3N 148.5W 5:44 — 0.02
32 DART 46403 52.7N 156.9W 5:28 — 0.02
33 DART 46402 51.1N 164.0W 6:09 — 0.02
34 DART 46419 48.8N 129.6W 3:44 — 0.07
35 DART 46404 45.9N 128.8W 4:17 — 0.05
36 DART 46407 42.6N 128.9W 4:56 — 0.07
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Saturday, October 27 at 5:04 (pm). The initial earthquake estimated magnitude Mw
was 7.1, later corrected to Mw 7.8 (USGS); this was the second largest recorded
earthquake in the region. The earthquake generated a tsunami, and post-tsunami
field survey results show inundation depths in the near-source area on the coast of
Haida Gwaii were up to 2.2 m (Leonard et al. 2012).
The current seismo-tectonic setting offshore Haida Gwaii is dominated by the
Queen Charlotte Fault zone, which is a transpressive boundary between the Pacific
and North America Plates along the northwest margin of Canada (Govers & Meijer
2001; Bustin et al. 2007; Xue & Allen 2007; Doser & Rodriguez 2011; Duchesne et al.
2011 ), as presented in figure 3(a).
The main Queen Charlotte Fault is located immediately offshore the Haida Gwaii
and extends north-westward at an azimuth of 319 (Bustin et al. 2007), from the tri-
ple junction (where the three plates converge) to the Fairweather Fault off the west
coast of Alaska, USA.
The October 28 earthquake had a strike of 319 (USGS), which is in agreement
with the plate boundaries. In addition, the relative Pacific/North America motion
along the fault zone is primarily right-lateral transform (strike-slip) at a rate of about
50 mm yr¡1 (Bustin et al. 2007; Doser & Rodriguez 2011); however, there is also a
significant component, about 15 mm yr¡1, of convergence across the margin (Bustin
et al. 2007; Doser & Rodriguez 2011). These components make the direction of
motion of the Pacific plate relative to North America (at the latitude of the epicentre
of the October 28 earthquake), as represented by the arrow in figure 3(a) (Bustin
et al. 2007; Doser & Rodriguez 2011). The October 28 earthquake occurred at a
depth of 14 km, and had a dip angle of 17 (USGS), which are in agreement with the
aftershocks’ depths (figure 3(b)) and local convergence.
In addition, the historic seismicity was compiled from the USGS website from
March 1, 1973, to October 30, 2012. The magnitudes vary between 2.5 and 6.7, as
shown in figure 4. There are two main earthquake clusters in the area: above 52N,
the earthquakes occur on the Queen Charlotte Fault, while below 52N the
Figure 3. The seismo-tectonics of the Queen Charlotte fault: (a) Location of the Queen
Charlotte Fault and plate boundaries; (b) aftershocks of the October 28 earthquake.
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earthquakes are associated with the Explorer and Juan de Fuca plates (figure 4(a)).
There were five earthquakes of magnitude higher than 6.0 on the Queen Charlotte
Fault: two events in 2001, one event in 2009 and two in 2012, which are considered
aftershocks of the October 28 earthquake. The historic seismicity shows the earth-
quakes generated in the area are shallow (mostly less than 10 km). Thus, the depth
and dip angle of the October 28 earthquake are in agreement with historic data. The
additional source parameters (USGS) are: slip D 110, fault length D 150 km, fault
width D 60 km, dislocation D 3 m.
3.2 Numerical model results
The Okada (1985) formulas were used to calculate the initial sea surface displace-
ment, with the source parameters presented above. Then, the tsunami numerical
modelling was carried out by using the linear shallow water theory in a spherical
coordinate system, with a staggered leap-frog scheme (Imamura 1995). Furthermore,
one-minute cell size bathymetry data are used (GEBCO 2003), with a time step of 3 s
for the numerical model. The calculations were conducted for 12 h of computation
time.
The plot of the sea surface displacement is shown in figure 5(a). The maximum
uplift is 1.2 m, while the subsidence is 0.4 m. The tsunami travel times through the
Pacific Ocean are presented in figure 5(b), showing that at about 5 hours and
30 minutes after the earthquake, the tsunami reaches Hawaii, which are in agreement
with tide gauge data (table 2).
The maximum water level is shown in figure 5(c), where it is clear that the energy is
mainly focused slightly northward of Hawaii, and not towards the Islands. In addi-
tion, the maximum water level decreases with distance from the tsunami source area.
The tsunami water level waveforms are presented in figure 6. The model results
show amplitudes below 0.5 m, except in Hawaii, where there were local
Figure 4. Historic seismicity off-shore Canada and the epicentre of the October 28 earth-
quake: (a) magnitude; (b) focal depth.
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amplifications at Haleiwa (#23), Mokuloe (#24), Kahului (#27) and Kawaihae
(#28). The wave period on Hawaii stations is about 10 min.
The summary of the observed and modelled travel times at the tide gauge stations is
presented in table 2. The time difference is also presented, showing that the model
arrives 1.7 min earlier than the observed stations, with a standard deviation of 9.0
min. The bathymetry data used in the tsunami numerical model have one-minute cell
size, which is not accurate enough inside bays and harbours (e.g., Santos et al. 2009).
Therefore, excluding the tide gauge stations located on these areas (Kodiak (#2), Sea-
ward (#3), Yakutat (#4), Elfin Cove (#5), Sitka (#6), Neah bay (#9) and Port Angels
(#10)), the model arrives 2.6 min earlier than the observed stations, with a standard
deviation of 7.2 min. On the seven DART stations, the model arrives 1.6 min earlier
than the observed stations, with a standard deviation of 3.0 min. These results show
the observed travel times validate the source model proposed in this study.
4. Tsunami evacuation information
The authors have compiled information related to the tsunami evacuation process in
Hawaii on live broadcasting for about nine hours, on CNN TV Channel, Hawaii
Now Online and the Tsunami Information Website to Hawaii (http://hitsunami.info/),
which included live broadcasting of the roads at the tsunami inundation zones. In
addition, other evacuation information, including timeline, was compiled from six
online archives that contain the eyewitnesses’ accounts (Barut & Roig 2012; Corrigan
2012; Osher 2012; SAAP 2012; Scheuring & Meiers 2012; Zimmerman 2012). The
analysis and discussion of the evacuation process in Hawaii are based on the facts
reported by the witnesses.
On Saturday evening (October 27, 2012) people across the state of Hawaii were
enjoying early Halloween events and street festivals, dinner parties with friends and
family, movies and even a wedding (Zimmerman 2012). The weather conditions were
as expected for that time of year (NOAA 2012), with temperatures ranging between
22.2 and 28.9 C in Lihue, Kauai Island (figure 7), 23.3 and 30.0 C in Honolulu
(Oahu Island), 21.7 and 28.9 C in Kahului (Maui Island), 18.3 and 28.3 C in Hilo,
Hawaii Island (Big Island), with an average relative humidity ranging between 62
and 76% for the four islands mentioned. Heavy rain was observed in Hilo (2.79 mm),
light rain in Lihue (1.02 mm) and trace precipitation in Kahului.
When the earthquake occurred (3:04 UTC on October 28, or 17:00 Hawaii Stan-
dard Time (HST) on October 27) the PTWC announced that no action was needed
Figure 5. Tsunami numerical model results: (a) sea surface displacement, in metres; (b) tsu-
nami travel times; (c) maximum water level.
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(table 3). At 3:45 (UTC) an Information Only statement was issued to the state of
Hawaii, informing the tsunami waves would arrive from 8:28 (UTC), or 10:28 HST.
Then, two hours after the earthquake, 5:09 (UTC) or about 7 pm HST, a tsunami
warning was issued for the state of Hawaii by the PTWC, meaning that it is necessary
to evacuate low-lying coastal areas.









1 Sand Point, AK 224 239 15
2 Kodiak Island, AK 177 178 1
3 Seward, AK 176 187 11
4 Yakutat, AK 138 122 16
5 Elfin Cove, AK 90 104 14
6 Sitka, AK 82 106 24
7 Port Alexander, AK 66 67 1
8 Winter harbour, BC 57 44 13
9 Neah bay, WA 119 108 11
10 Port Angeles, WA 166 150 16
11 La Push, WA 104 104 0
12 Westport, WA 129 129 0
13 Garibaldi, OR 128 129 1
14 South beach, OR 144 137 7
15 Charleston, OR 139 140 1
16 Port Orford, OR 137 131 6
17 Crescent city, CA 160 155 5
18 Arena Cove, CA 177 173 4
19 San Francisco, CA 228 223 5
20 Port San Luis, CA 234 234 0
21 Hanalei, HI 325 327 2
22 Nawiliwili, HI 347 321 26
23 Haleiwa, HI 326 322 4
24 Mokuloe, HI 330 330 0
25 Honolulu, HI 340 335 5
26 Makapuu, HI 326 326 0
27 Kahului, HI 333 326 7
28 Kawaihae, HI 338 347 9
29 Hilo, HI 333 322 11
30 DART 46410 84 88 4
31 DART 46409 100 97 3
32 DART 46403 144 142 2
33 DART 46402 185 182 3
34 DART 46419 40 39 1
35 DART 46404 73 72 1
36 DART 46407 112 106 6
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However, only about one hour after the tsunami warning was issued to Hawaii the
tsunami sirens began blaring, and about 100,000 people evacuated mostly by car,
causing traffic congestion. In Oahu, the sirens prompted an immediate crush of traf-
fic in Honolulu, with many motorists stopping at service stations to fill gasoline
(Barut & Roig 2012). During the evacuation, at least four major car accidents were
reported by the State Emergency Medical Services at Oahu (Osher 2012). Although
Figure 6. Tsunami numerical model results: tsunami water level waveforms.
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there were no immediate reports of damage in the state, one person died in a fatal
crash near a road that was closed near the Oahu’s north shore (Hainsworth 2012).
Then, at 6:36 (UTC), or 8:36 pm (HST), Maui Civil Defence Agency also issued a
tsunami warning and an immediate evacuation advisory for all persons in low-lying
Figure 7. Hawaii Islands and the places described by the witnesses during the evacuation: (a)
main islands; (b) Kauai; (c) Oahu; (d) Molokai; (e) Maui; (f) Hawaii (Big Island).
Table 3. Timeline of the evacuation process at Hawaii.
Time (UTC) Actions taken
3:04 The PTWC announces a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake had hit Haida
Gwaii in British Columbia, Canada, but no tsunami was generated and
no action was needed.
3:21 Information only to the state of Hawaii: Pacific-wide destructive tsunami is
not expected and there is no tsunami threat to Hawaii.
3:45 Information only to the state of Hawaii: Based on all available data there is
no destructive tsunami threat to Hawaii. However, some coastal areas in
Hawaii could experience small non-destructive sea level changes and
strong or unusual currents lasting up to several hours. The estimated
time such effects might begin is: 10:28 pm HST, Saturday October 27,
2012 (8:28 UTC, Sunday October 28, 2012).
5:09 First tsunami warning was issued for the state of Hawaii by the PTWC.
6:00 Tsunami sirens began blaring across the island, prompting a mass exodus of
more than 100,000 people that blocked roadways as motorists fled low-
lying areas. Tsunami sirens initially failed to work in Keaukaha,
Waiakea and in some areas of Puna (East Hawaii, figure 6(f)) but the
problem was rapidly solved (SAAP 2012).
6:36 Maui Civil Defence Agency also issued a tsunami warning and an
immediate evacuation advisory for all persons in low-lying coastal areas,
ordering to evacuate immediately to higher ground. Water and sewer
services were closed in preparation for the tsunami. Heavy traffic was
reported in South Maui (figure 6(e)) at the Ohukai/South Kihei Road
intersection (figure 7), through Lahaina Town in both Front Street and
Honoapiilani Highway in town (figure 4(a)).
(continued)
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coastal areas, ordering to evacuate immediately to higher ground. This happened
about 1 hour and 30 minutes after the initial tsunami warning was issued. Water and
sewer services were closed in preparation for the tsunami. However, heavy traffic
was reported in South Maui (figure 7(e)) at the Ohukai/South Kihei Road intersec-
tion (figure 8(a)), through Lahaina Town in both Front Street and Honoapiilani
Table 3. (Continued ).
Time (UTC) Actions taken
7:00 Kahului Airport, Maui Island (figures 6(e) and 7(c)) still had three
incoming flights planned. Other flights were standing for clearance.
Hotels had evacuation plans in place and clearance was given to all hotel
guests in a high rise, above the fourth floor. All persons outside the
evacuation areas were advised to stay off the roads and highways and
refrain from sightseeing (Osher 2012). At the Hilo International Airport,
vehicles lined up in an orderly fashion in order to evacuate Keaukaha
(figure 6(f)) (Corrigan 2012).
7:09 The Department of Education opened the Maui High School gymnasium
(figure 6(b)) as an evacuation centre. Maui Police Department sent units
to evacuate beaches and other low-lying areas.
7:30 All roads in the tsunami zone were closed, except for emergency vehicles.
7:40 Lahainaluna High School gymnasium (figure 7(b)), Molokai High
(figure 6(d)) and Community Centre parking lots were also available for
use as well.
8:10 The Maui Research and Technology Park (figure 7(a)) was opened as a
waiting area for the public.
8:17 The King Kaumualli Elementary School holding area, in Kauai Island
(figure 6(b)), was reported full and people in the Lihue and Hanamaulu
areas were directed to the Wilcox Elementary School (Scheuring &
Meiers 2012).
8:28 The counties of Maui, Hawaii Island, Kauai and Oahu reported either little
or no damage from the tsunami waves, but there were four serious car
accidents in Oahu, and in Molokai, there was some damage to property
near the ocean (Zimmerman 2012).
Tsunami waves did begin to hit Hawaii every 1012 min, but they were just
about 45 cm in height. In Maui, waves reached as high as 1.35 m in
Kahului.
9:00 Smooth evacuation on Front Street in West Maui (figure 4(a)). Surges were
reported in the East Maui area of Hana (figure 1(e)).
10:22 All water and wastewater services were restored to all areas though the
tsunami warning was still in effect.
11:02 The PTWC downgraded the warning to a tsunami advisory, allowing
people to return to their homes in low-lying areas 30 min later.
11:26 Maui County Civil Defence authorities said that based on all available
data, the tsunami threat had decreased and was then at the advisory level
and not expected to increase. Sea-level changes and strong currents
might still occur along all coasts that could be a hazard to swimmers and
boaters as well as to persons near the shore at beaches and in harbours
and marinas. The threat might continue for several hours. Beaches would
be closed until the advisory was cancelled (Osher 2012).
13:58 The tsunami advisory for the state of Hawaii was cancelled.
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Highway in town (figure 8(b)). All these roads are located in the tsunami inundation
zones (figure 8), which are available for public at the Pacific Disaster Centre website.
At 7:00 (UTC) or 9:00 pm (HST), at the Kahului airport, Maui Island (figures 7(e)
and figure 8(c)) still had three incoming flights planned. Other flights were standing
for clearance. The concern about the Kahului airport was related to the fact that
some parts of the airport are inside the tsunami inundation zones.
From 7:09 (UTC) or 9:09 pm (HST) the evacuation centres started to open for
public use (figure 7). And only two hours after the initial tsunami warning was issued
the Maui Police Department sent units to evacuate beaches and other low-lying
areas. About 5 hours and 30 minutes after the earthquake, at 8:28 (UTC), or 10:28
(HST), the tsunami waves started to arrive at Hawaii, giving a travel time of 324
min. This is in agreement with the tsunami only statement issued by the PTWC at
3:45 (UTC). The tsunami was recorded on the tide gauge stations of Nawiliwili
(#22), with 0.03 m, at Kahului (#27) with 0.76 m, at Hilo (#29) with 0.091 m and at
Kawaiha (#28) with 0.56 m.
The counties of Maui, Hawaii Island, Kauai and Oahu reported either little or no
damage from the tsunami waves, and in Molokai, there was some damage to prop-
erty near the ocean. The maximum water level height in Hawaii was 1.35 m at
Kahului. While the tsunami waves were reported in the East Maui area of Hana
(figure 7(e)), a smooth evacuation was still in place on Front Street in the West Maui
(figure 4(a)). But only between 9:02 and 9:16 (UTC) the first tsunami waves were
reported by the PTWC.
At 10:22 (UTC), or 0:22 am (HST), all water and wastewater services were restored
to all areas though the tsunami warning was still in effect. One hour later, at 11:22
(UTC), or 1:02am (HST), the warning was downgraded to a tsunami advisory,
Figure 8. Evacuation details at Maui Island (figure 6(e)), showing the streets where heavy
traffic was reported, the tsunami inundation areas, and the location of the evacuation areas.
(a) South Kihei; (b) Lahaina; (c) Kahului.
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allowing people to return to their homes in low-lying areas 30 min later, and at 13:58
(UTC), or 3:58 am (HST), the tsunami advisory was cancelled. This happened almost
nine hours after the tsunami warning was issued to the state of Hawaii.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The 2012 Haida Gwaii Tsunami was triggered by a magnitude Mw 7.8 earthquake,
which was the largest event recorded on the Queen Charlotte Fault. The initial sea sur-
face displacement had a maximum uplift of 1.2 m, while the subsidence was 0.4 m. The
tsunami numerical model results show the proposed source model arrives on average
1.7 min earlier than the 36 observed stations, with a standard deviation of 9.0 min.
However, excluding the tide gauge stations located on the bays (Kodiak (#2), Seaward
(#3), Yakutat (#4), Elfin Cove (#5), Sitka (#6), Neach bay (#9) and Port Angels
(#10)), the model arrives 2.6 min earlier than the observed stations, with a standard
deviation of 7.2 min. On the seven DART stations, the model arrives 1.6 min later
than the observed stations, with a standard deviation of 3.0 min. These results show
the observed travel times validate, in general, the source model proposed in this study.
The modelled water level waveforms show the tsunami amplitude was less than 0.5 m
in height. Although local amplifications were obtained in Hawaii (Haleiwa (#23),
Mokuloe (#24), Kahului (#27) and Kawaihae (#28)), the tsunami numerical results
show the 2012 Haida Gwaii Tsunami would not generate widespread inundation. This
was confirmed by the counties of Kauai, Oahu, Maui and Hawaii Island, which
reported either little or no damage from the tsunami waves. On Molokai Island there
was some damage to property near the ocean. Therefore, the tsunami warning issued
to Hawaii would not be necessary. In fact, a PTWC spokesperson admitted that the
warning “probably was not necessary” (Zimmerman 2012) because they made some
errors. If they had not made the errors, smaller waves would have been predicted and
there would have been a tsunami advisory issued for Hawaii.
On the other hand, the modelled water level waveforms also show the period at
Hawaii stations is about 10 min. Eyewitnesses also reported that tsunami waves did
begin to hit Hawaii from 8:28 (UTC) at every 1012 minutes, but they were just
about 0.45 m in height. In Maui, waves reached as high as 1.35 m in Kahului. The
arrival time reported by the witnesses is in agreement with the tsunami only statement
issued by the PTWC at 3:45 (UTC), which correctly forecast the arrival time of the
tsunami. In addition, the tsunami numerical model results fit the results obtained by
the eyewitnesses’ accounts (table 3) and tide gauge data at Hawaii (table 2), except in
Nawiliwili (#22). The good performance of the tsunami numerical model shows the
proposed source model is correct and therefore it is a good tool for the tsunami
warning system.
The eyewitnesses’ accounts also show that only about one hour after the tsunami
warning was issued to Hawaii the tsunami sirens began blaring, initiating the evacua-
tion of about 100,000 residents and tourists. Hawaiians were in a good mood and
were partying; they responded well to the evacuation, they knew the location of the
evacuation centres and some witnesses even continued to party on higher ground.
However, because most people evacuated by car, heavy traffic was observed and
four car accidents were reported in Oahu, causing one fatality. It is believed that mis-
haps and human errors can be prevented if adequate consideration is given to human
factors during the design of emergency planning operations (Woodcok & Au 2013).
Therefore, evacuating by car is a kind of human behaviour that has been raising
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some concern because similar situations have been reported. For example, during the
May 9, 2010, earthquake, at Banda Aceh, Indonesia, which although did not cause a
tsunami, there was massive disorder and traffic congestion during the evacuation
(Affan et al. 2012). Likewise, the eyewitnesses’ accounts of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami
also reported traffic congestion at five coastal cities and towns (NHK Morioka
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e) because many people evacuated by car; those
who remained in their cars were caught by the tsunami and died. These facts show
that even when a coastal community has been experiencing tsunamis, and with regu-
lar practice of evacuation exercises, the evacuation procedures need to be constantly
improved and re-evaluated.
Moreover, the weather conditions at Hawaii were comfortable. The situation
might be different, however, if the evacuation would happen during day time, with
the maximum temperature being 30 C, because weather conditions influence human
behaviour during an evacuation (Greenough et al. 2001). Some witnesses questioned
if the evacuation was really necessary, since small waves were observed at the coast;
others were complaining that they could not return home. It is important to point
out that although the tsunami arrived to Hawaii on Saturday evening, only at 11:02
(UTC) or 1:02 am (HST), the tsunami warning was downgraded to an advisory. Some
evacuation centres were reported full and people had to be diverted to other areas.
Another eyewitness said the state did not overreacted at all. The same witness said “I
was blown away at the coordinated effort on all the islands. I felt secure with all the
precautions” (Barut & Roig 2012). Therefore, the “always evacuate” idea is not
straightforward, and for this reason, it is important to avoid false alarms. Also, risk
communication strategies should emphasize preparedness and offer information
about preventive measures or filling the gap between the institutional levels and com-
munity by interactions with actors (Tavares & Mendes 2010), which can stimulate
better public recognition of the information (Tavares & Santos 2014).
Nevertheless, this event provided useful lessons for future tsunami mitigation, not
only to Hawaii, but also to other coastal communities that might be vulnerable to
tsunamis: the warning system does not serve the need in an emergency situation, if it
is not consistent with an effective risk communication, where the information dis-
semination and monitoring of public response is crucial. Therefore, parallel to a
warning system, tsunami education programmes should be articulated with traffic
congestion simulations, studies of road traffic (Affan et al. 2012), as well as dissemi-
nation of informative pamphlets (Santos et al. 2013), regular siren exercises, dissemi-
nation of tsunami hazard maps for public use, and the implementation of emergency
plans, which should be tested and updated by conducting evacuation exercises
(Queiros & Santos 2013). Although the frequency of earthquakes and tsunamis has
remained stable (Dunbar et al. 2010), the increasing density of populations at the
coastal areas raises the need of tsunami awareness.
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